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Party Conventions Are Free-For-All for Influence Peddling 
 
The Soft Money Loophole for Lobbyists 
 
 The Democratic and Republican national conventions are supposed to be publicly financed 
electoral events with reasonable ethics restrictions on influence-peddling by lobbyists. However, the 
conventions have become mostly privately financed soirees funded by corporations and lobbying firms 
that seek favors from the federal government. The unlimited soft money donations from special 
interests to pay for the conventions, and the lavish parties and wining and dining at the conventions, 
run counter to the federal election law and congressional ethics rules. 
 
 Today, the presidential nominating conventions are not very newsworthy because the 
presumptive nominees are chosen in advance; fewer people care about the conventions, as declining 
TV viewership shows; and yet more special interest money than ever is raised and spent at the 
conventions.  Under the guise of “civic boosterism” unlimited and unregulated contributions are 
funneled through a giant loophole to host committees that largely serve the political purpose of 
providing advertising and access to corporate and other moneyed contributors. 
 
 Two separate codes were intended, but largely have failed, to make the nominating conventions 
more respectable political events. The first is the decades-old ban contained in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) on “soft money” – funds from corporate or union treasuries or large individual 
contributions in excess of the limits – to pay for the conventions. The second is the new congressional 
ethics rules that restrict the manner in which lobbyists and lobbying organizations may host parties and 
offer gifts to members of Congress. 
 
A. FECA and the $100 Million Soft Money Loophole 
 
  The presidential public financing system was created in 1974 to replace potentially corrupting 
unregulated money (now known commonly as “soft money”) with public funds guaranteed to pay for 
the conventions first, the presidential general elections second, and the presidential primary elections 
last.1 
 
 This public financing system came in the wake of a convention fundraising scandal under the 
Nixon Administration. In May 1971, the giant International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation 
(IT&T) pledged up to $400,000 to attract the 1972 Republican National Convention to San Diego. The 
company was facing several anti-trust lawsuits under the Nixon Administration. Just eight days after 
the selection of San Diego for the Republican convention, Deputy Attorney General Richard 
Kleindienst agreed to an out-of-court anti-trust settlement with IT&T that the company considered 
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very favorable. Democratic National Committee Chair Lawrence O’Brien wrote to Attorney General 
John Mitchell demanding to know whether the settlement with IT&T was linked to the company’s 
pledge to the Republican convention. 
 
 Later testimony in congressional hearings revealed that IT&T executives and Nixon 
Administration officials had met repeatedly in secret in 1970 and 1971 on the anti-trust suits, and while 
negotiations were in process, IT&T made the offer to underwrite the party’s convention. Internal 
memos within the Administration urged the Justice Department to go easy on IT&T. A reluctant 
Justice Department official was promptly fired by Nixon, and a settlement emerged a short time later.2 
 
 Despite all the secrecy, the scandal broke publicly with a column by Jack Anderson on 
February 29, 1972. In an abrupt shift to save face, the Republican Party abandoned its plans for San 
Diego and made a last-minute and costly move of its convention to Miami Beach. 
 
 1. The Law Regarding Convention Financing 
 
 FECA’s public financing program for the presidential nominating conventions created a system 
in which the parties, in exchange for accepting reasonable spending ceilings on their conventions, 
would receive a grant from the federal government to pay for nearly all expenses of the conventions. 
Originally, the spending ceiling and grant was set at $2 million, to be adjusted for inflation. FECA was 
soon amended to increase the spending ceiling and grant to $4 million.  
 
 The law specifies that the national committee of a major party may not make expenditures for a 
presidential nominating convention in excess of public funds provided, with one exception. The 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) may authorize the national committee of a party to exceed the 
spending ceiling for the conventions “based upon a determination by the Commission that, due to 
extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances, such expenditures are necessary to assure the effective 
operation of the presidential nominating convention by such committee.”3  
 
 Nevertheless, such additional funds in response to “extraordinary and unforeseen 
circumstances” must not be in the form of soft money. Even before the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (BCRA), popularly known as McCain-Feingold, affirmed the ban on soft money for 
federal candidates and party committees, FECA had long prohibited corporations, labor unions and 
banks from making contributions to federal candidates, officeholders and national parties “or in 
connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates” for 
federal office.4 
 
But the parties needed a helping hand from the FEC to chip away at the ban against soft money 
contributions for conventions. The FEC obliged with a series of controversial advisory opinions and 
regulations. Most of these rulings no doubt were originally intended to ease financial and accounting 
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burdens on the political parties and to pave the way for smooth operation of the nominating 
conventions. In the end, however, they reversed the ethical gains sought by FECA and have largely 
returned the financing of presidential conventions back to the Watergate-era system. 
 
 The FEC determined that each national party must form a presidential convention committee 
subject to the contribution and spending restrictions and reporting requirements of FECA. However, 
the Commission redefined several types of expenditures as falling outside the category of convention-
related expenditures, and thus exempt from the spending ceiling for party convention committees.5 
 
 Much more significantly, the FEC determined that wealthy individuals, corporations, unions, 
and even banks may make unlimited contributions, for certain purposes, to “host committees” 
unaffiliated with the national party convention committee. A host committee is “any local organization 
which is not organized for profit; whose net earnings do not inure to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual; and whose principal objective is the encouragement of commerce in the 
convention city, as well as the projection of a favorable image of the city to convention attendees.”6  
Today, these “host committees” claim their nonprofit status – collecting unlimited and unregulated 
funds – by stating that their purpose is to raise funds for “civic boosterism” in the convention host 
cities – not for political purposes. 
 
 Another source of private funding for the presidential conventions, which was originally 
envisioned as a government source of funds, is the “municipal fund.”  As early as 1982, an FEC 
advisory opinion opened the door for municipal funds to supplement the financing of presidential 
conventions.7 The opinion permitted the creation of the Dallas Convention Fund, a local entity which 
could raise funds from wealthy individuals, corporations, unions and banks, in addition to public funds, 
and spend that money for certain convention-related activities. The major condition on municipal funds 
is that they are supposed to be long-term entities whose principal purpose is to promote any and all 
conventions in the city, not just presidential conventions.8 
 
 More often, however, municipal funds seem to rise and disappear with the presidential 
conventions. The Dallas Convention Fund in 1982 is a prime example. The Dallas municipal fund was 
in fact chaired by Washington political insider and real estate developer Trammell Crow with 
corporate offices at 30th and K Streets.9 Shortly after the 1984 Republican national convention, the 
Dallas Convention Fund folded. 
 
 FEC Commissioner Thomas Harris back in the early 1980s saw the danger of these exemptions 
getting out of control. He wrote in a dissenting opinion: “By permitting corporations and unions to 
donate unlimited amounts of money to fund political conventions, the Commission is ignoring one of 
the clear concerns of 2 U.S.C. 441(b) and its predecessor statutes – that is, the fear of the influence of 
aggregated wealth on the political process. The fact that the donations are to be funneled through a 
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‘Convention Fund’ does not alleviate the problem. The proposed Republican National Convention 
apparently will be the first to be financed by the Dallas Convention Fund … The Commission has 
forgotten that when it approved the regulations permitting business and municipal involvement in the 
financing of political conventions, it was creating a narrow exception to the broad prohibition of 2 
U.S.C. 441(b).”10 
 
 Originally, the FEC limited the soft money loophole for host committees and municipal funds 
to corporations and unions with a “local tie” to the community hosting the convention. The “local tie” 
restriction was easily evaded. In the 2000 Republican convention in Philadelphia, for example, some 
473 business and governmental entities contributed to the Republican convention. The three largest 
companies that received contracts from the host committee were based in Louisiana, California and 
Virginia but had local affiliates.11 In 2003, the FEC dismissed the requirement of a local tie for 
corporate contributions to host committees and municipal funds altogether.12  
 
 The official convention committee of the political party, which is not allowed to accept soft 
money, must file regular quarterly and post-convention reports disclosing how it is using the public 
funds for the conventions and any contracts made by the committee, host committee or municipal 
funds for convention expenditures. Host committees and municipal funds, on the other hand, file their 
disclosure reports 60 days after the convention with the FEC.13 
 
 2. The Flood of Soft Money into the Conventions 
 
 Commissioner Harris’ prediction that the host committee exception could become a gaping soft 
money loophole has come true with a vengeance. In 1976, both parties paid for their conventions 
almost exclusively from public funds, about $2 million each. In 1980 and 1984, the parties still relied 
mostly on public funds to pay for their conventions, at slightly more than $4 million in 1980 and 
somewhat more than $7 million in 1984. Soft money had only begun to creep into the picture. 
 
 By 1996 the use of privately financed “host committees” by the parties had overwhelmed the 
public financing program. Both conventions received private funds amounting to nearly double the 
public grant.  
 
 Today, public funds make up only a modest share of the total (inflated) cost of the conventions. 
In 2000, for example, each party was awarded about $13.5 million to pay for its nominating 
convention. Private sources chipped in an additional $36 million for the Democratic convention in Los 
Angeles, and $20 million for the Republican convention in Philadelphia. In 2004, the $14.9 million 
public grant for each convention was utterly dwarfed by an additional $57 million in private 
contributions for the Democratic convention and $86 million for the Republican convention. In 2008, 
well in excess of $112 million combined in soft money is expected to drown the $16.4 million public 
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grants for the conventions, though the actual accounting will not be available until 60 days after the 
conventions – just about Election Day.14 
 
 3. What Do They Get for Their Money? 
 
 Nearly all of the private donors to the convention host committees have business pending 
before Congress or the White House and have made substantial campaign contributions and lobbying 
expenditures to press their interests. As of August 2008, 173 organizational donors to the host 
committees have been identified, and all but two are corporations. These donors have made more than 
$1.5 billion in lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions, since 2005.15 These companies want 
something from the federal government – and they are willing to pay. 
 
 With soft money now banned for federal candidates and party committees, the host committee 
loophole allows these companies to indirectly funnel six-figure checks to the presidential candidates 
and party leaders. Host committees can use this money to pay for many of the expenses associated with 
the conventions, including construction of convention facilities, travel and local transportation, 
delegate receptions and tours, media facilities, and similar convention-related services.16 Host 
committee budgets and planning are largely directed and approved by the official party convention 
committee – in other words, the party leaders coordinating the presidential and congressional 
campaigns. The conventions serve as big advertisements for the presidential candidates and 
congressional leadership, and these lawmakers know which corporations are paying for their ads. 
 
 Corporations and their lobbyists also purchase a great deal of one-on-one time with lawmakers 
at the conventions. In return for their donations to the convention host committees, corporate sponsors 
to the conventions are promised a variety of benefits, ranging from advertising opportunities to VIP 
tickets to the convention centers. Each host committee advertises numerous levels of sponsorship – the 
greater the contribution, the greater the access to advertising opportunities and elected officials. 
Additionally, the Sponsorship Packet offers corporate contributors the chance to buy access to party 
luminaries by hosting or sponsoring events such as state delegation receptions. 
 
 The RNC Corporate Sponsorship Packet of the Minneapolis/St. Paul (MSP) host committee 
offers seven levels of sponsorship for the RNC convention. These are: 
 
• Viking sponsor. For $50,000 or more, the donor receives credentialed tickets to convention 
sessions, invitations to all 2008 host committee leadership events, and is listed as a sponsor in 
official guide books and on the 2008 website.17  
• Bronze Sponsor. For $100,000, donors get the same perks as Viking Sponsors with additional 
access to “premier” Minneapolis/St. Paul venues for “corporate hospitality” events and to the 
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Xcel Center Hospitality Suite. Companies that attain this level of sponsorship, such as Land 
O’Lakes and Waste Management, may also opt to sponsor volunteer uniforms and water 
bottles.18  
• Silver Sponsor. For $250,000, donors such as Cargill, Eli Lily, Koch, and Wells Fargo gain 
“special access” to all host committee parties and events and to the Host Committee Suite at the 
Convention Center. Their status as a Silver Sponsor also qualifies these companies to be the 
exclusive official provider of a particular service to the convention.19  
• Gold Sponsor. For $500,000, donors gain the added perk of participation in tours of the 
convention spaces and cities during “Get to Know Minneapolis/St. Paul Days.”20 
• Platinum Sponsor. For $1 million, donors such as Xcel, UnitedHealth, Medtronic, St. Jude 
Medical, and US Bank, win VIP access to the Xcel Center.21 Originally, Platinum Sponsors 
were also promised a private reception with Gov. Tim Pawlenty, Sen. Norm Coleman, and the 
mayors of St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Bloomington. This perk was removed from the publicized 
packet after a number of critical articles appeared in both local and national press. 
• Finance Vice-Chair. For $2.5 million, donors were also promised a golfing outing with 
Republican leadership, another bonus that was met with public outrage and subsequently 
dropped from the publicized packet.22 
• Finance Co-Chair. For $5 million, donors such as Qwest gain exclusive VIP access to the host 
committee media party and VIP tours of the Twin Cities.23  
 
 The DNC Corporate Sponsorship Packet enumerates five levels of sponsorship and their 
respective benefits. These are:  
 
• Mile High Plus. For $52,800, corporate donors of all levels receive invitations to host 
committee sponsored events such as the Media Welcoming Party and recognition in all host 
committee publications, as well as on the host committee website. Mile High Plus sponsors 
may choose to place products with the company’s logo in bags for delegates or the media, or 
they can opt to sponsor five information booths at the convention.24  
• Silver Sponsor. For $100,000, donors receive general tickets for convention sessions. 
• Gold Sponsor. For $250,000, donors such as ConocoPhillips, Eli Lily, and Staples gain access 
to the host committee hospitality suite and an invitation to attend a private event with Denver 
2008 Executive Committee members. Executive Committee members include Colorado 
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Governor Bill Ritter, Denver Mayor John Hickenlooper, Sen. Ken Salazar, and Rep. Diana 
DeGette. 
• Platinum Sponsor. For $500,000, donors are granted access to “premier” Denver venues for 
corporate hospitality events and receptions.  
• Presidential Sponsors. For $1 million, donors collect VIP tickets to the Convention Center and 
“first consideration” for popular Denver venues.25 Presidential sponsors of the 2008 DNC 
convention include Qwest, Xcel, Level 3 Communications, Molson-Coors, and Union Pacific.  
 
 These types of access-for-sale programs at the conventions have an eerie resemblance to the 
soft money programs that used to be offered by the national political parties prior to BCRA, and were 
cited by the Supreme Court as examples of potentially corrupting behavior. As the court explained in 
upholding BCRA’s ban on soft money to party committees: 
 
So pervasive is this practice that the six national party committees actually 
furnish their own menus of opportunity for access to would-be soft-money 
donors, with increased prices reflecting an increased level of access. For 
example, the DCCC offers a range of donor options, starting with the 
$10,000-per-year Business Forum program, and going up to the $100,000-
per-year National Finance Board program. The latter entitles the donor to 
bimonthly conference calls with the Democratic House leadership and chair 
of the DCCC, complimentary invitations to all DCCC fundraising events, 
two private dinners with the Democratic House leadership and ranking 
members, and two retreats with the Democratic House leader and DCCC 
chair in Telluride, Colorado, and Hyannisport, Massachusetts.26 
 
 The same type of influence peddling is going on currently with corporations giving unlimited 
soft money checks to the convention host committees. There is no small irony in the fact that it was the 
IT&T scandal in 1971 that helped create a system of publicly financing the national conventions, and 
today AT&T is one of the principal corporate sponsors of the 2008 Democratic convention. It has 
purchased the right to plaster its logo all over the conventions. This isn’t just advertising; this is 
attempting to buy influence with lawmakers. 
 
 4. Civic Boosterism or Boondoggle? 
 
Corporate sponsors and other deep-pocketed donors bypass campaign finance laws and funnel 
millions of dollars in soft-money contributions to national political party conventions. To justify their 
nonprofit status, host committees claim that their purpose is to raise funds for “civic boosterism” in the 
convention host cities – not for political purposes. This is false, considering that the host committees 
for the 2008 national party conventions are largely made up of officials from the convention party. In 
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fact, Republicans are leading the fundraising effort for the RNC Convention in the Twin Cities, and 
Democrats are fundraising for the DNC Convention in Denver.27  
 
How did Boston and New York fare as hosts of the 2004 conventions? Not as well as the host 
committees promised. It is also useful to imagine what civic boosterism in the 2008 host cities might 
look like and compare this to the way these funds will most likely be utilized. If civic boosterism is 
action on the part of local leaders to bring increased prosperity to their city, what would real civic 
boosterism in host cities look like? 
 
In news articles from convention week, Boston’s local business owners admitted that the 
convention might benefit Boston in the long term if the city were successful in showcasing its 
attractions. However, they noted that the immediate impact of the convention was often harmful to 
local businesses. On the one hand, because of road and lane closures, many workers opted to take 
vacations rather than deal with traffic, leading to a significant decrease in overall productivity. The 
cancellation of other tourist events (Sail Boston, U.S. Gymnastics Qualifying) due to the presence of 
the convention represented an additional loss in revenue for the city.28 Furthermore, because of the 
extensive security measures taken to make the convention safe, virtually no tourists visited Boston 
during the convention, except those attending the convention, and they spent most of their time and 
money at the convention and convention-related events.29 
 
Local business owners also expressed disappointment and anger at turnout during the 
convention, which fell far short of the city’s promises. Many were forced to send employees home 
early, including restaurants and bakeries that had overstocked to prepare for convention. Among the 
businesses most heavily affected by the convention, North End restaurants and bakeries saw sales 
decline 50 percent during convention week.30 In addition to these quantifiable losses, there is no way to 
accurately calculate the frustration and inconvenience the convention caused for Boston’s residents, in 
particular those business owners who lost almost a quarter of their expected monthly revenue. 
 
According to news articles from convention week, restaurants took the biggest hit from 
increased security and protests surrounding the convention. On the other hand, a select few caterers 
servicing private events and corporate parties benefited from the convention’s presence in the city.31 
Many storeowners were upset because the impact of the convention was not at all what the city had 
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promised. Some reported that sales fell so drastically that they could not be recovered quickly enough 
to cover the month’s expenses.32 
 
In New York during the 2004 Republican convention, numerous Broadway shows had to shut 
down completely because tourists stayed away and delegates were too busy to attend.33  According to a 
CoreNet Global survey, it was not only the entertainment business that suffered – New York area 
corporate real estate managers expected declines in productivity and a negative impact on the bottom 
line of city revenues as a result of the convention. As was the case in Boston, many workers chose to 
take leave or telecommute to avoid traffic and security.34 
 
 The evidence from the 2004 conventions suggests that while the conventions may showcase the 
host city and offer a one-time source of revenue to select businesses, the intended purpose of the host 
committees’ fundraising efforts cannot justifiably be said to be civic boosterism. Genuine civic 
boosterism in Denver and the Twin Cities would take a much different form.  
 
In Denver, Qwest’s $6 million donation, were it truly invested in civic boosterism – instead of 
buying influence – could fund Denver’s Safe City Initiatives for 4 years. These initiatives work to 
create a restorative justice system for Denver’s youth, and serve approximately 4,100 young people 
each year.35 Xcel Energy’s $2.25 million donation could fund Denver’s Diversion and Youth 
Development program for nine years. The Diversion and Youth Development program offers almost 
200 youth paid positions in crime prevention, community service, and peer mentoring, and is part of an 
effort to combat violence by and against Denver youth.36  
 
In Minnesota, state officials predict that the cost of repairing the I-35 bridge that tragically 
collapsed last summer in Minneapolis will cause a backlog on other needed road repair and new road 
construction.37 Critics worry that this delay could lead to other safety problems on Minnesota roads. 
The predicted amount of corporate contributions to the GOP Convention could finance almost a 
quarter of the bridge currently under construction to replace the bridge that collapsed last August. 
Kraft’s single contribution of $76,237 could buy Youth Are Here buses for Minnesota’s Youth 
Coordinating Board (YCB). YCB works to ensure that the city’s youth are equipped to succeed in 
school and in the working world by engaging community member and parents and facilitating positive 
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activities for youth. The Youth Are Here buses are intended to provide safe transportation to and from 
these activities.38 
 
Thus, while conventions may benefit the host city in some ways, the host committees’ activities 
cannot be accurately described as civic boosterism because the host cities’ ordinary citizens and small 
businesses are largely shut out of convention activity. All told, if these extravagant corporate 
contributions were directed toward real civic boosterism, these funds could finance some of the cities’ 
most beneficial programs for years. It is clear that corporate contributions to the host committees are 
used to buy influence with lawmakers and party leaders. They do not serve the purpose of civic 
boosterism, nor are they intended to. The real boost from these huge contributions to the host 
committees is the cozy relations of party officials with corporations.  
 
B. Party Time on the Lobbyists’ Dime? Not So Fast 
 
 One way of buying influence with lawmakers is to make soft money contributions to the 
convention host committees. Another is to pay for a lavish reception or party at the convention for 
lawmakers and party leaders. Many of the corporate donors, like AT&T, make extensive use of both 
tactics. 
 
 One of the most effective ways for a lobbying organization to press its case before White 
House officials and congressional leaders is to get a little one-on-one time with the officials in a 
relaxed atmosphere of wining and dining. Wining and dining represents the old school of professional 
lobbying but, since the Jack Abramoff scandal of 2006, it has been sharply curtailed on Capitol Hill by 
new congressional ethics rules. 
 
 Many of the new congressional ethics rules also apply to the conventions. But this year is the 
first time the conventions will be subject to the new limits on lobbying activity. Wining and dining at 
parties and receptions has long been a mainstay for lobbyists who want to schmooze with lawmakers at 
the conventions. It is going to be difficult to impress upon governmental officials, party leaders and the 
lobbying community that some of the old-school behavior is no longer acceptable to the public and 
reflects poorly on the credibility of the party organization. 
 
 Just four years ago, the parties at the national conventions were more numerous and more 
pointedly set up for influence peddling by their corporate sponsors. For example, the Consumer 
Electronics Association, a lobbying organization with business pending before the House Commerce 
Committee, hosted a luncheon at the 2004 Republican convention to honor members of the House 
Commerce Committee. Media companies, seeking specific legislation from Congress, hosted a 
$300,000 “Caribbean Beach Bash” at the 2004 Democratic convention in honor of then-Sen. John 
Breaux (D-La.), a leading advocate of broadcasting and cable interests over the years. Individual party-
goers could pony up an additional $20,000 for some one-on-one time with the honoree. Though 
Breaux was retiring, the media lobbyists sent a clear message to his colleagues who remain: We 
support our friends.39 
                                                 
38
  2008 Adopted Budget, Minneapolis. <http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/city-
budget/2008adopted/index.asp#P12_1188>. 
39
  Bill McConnell, “Party Animals,” AllBusiness (June 21, 2004). 
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 “They will use this as a relationship-building vehicle with committee chairs and others who 
have oversight over their business,” said Harry Clark, a veteran lobbyist, referring generally to 
corporations hosting parties at the conventions.40 
 
 New congressional ethics rules adopted in 2007 place several constraints on this type of 
influence peddling at the conventions by lobbyists and lobbying organizations. The “Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act” contains a sweeping set of lobbying laws and ethics rules 
enhancing disclosure of lobbying activity and regulating the behavior of lobbyists, lobbying 
organizations, members of Congress and their staff. [For a detailed summary of the lobbying law, click 
here or visit http://www.citizen.org/documents/s.1 chart 3.doc] 
 
 In regard to wining and dining at the conventions, members of Congress and their staffs must 
exercise prudence in determining which parties to attend and in what capacity. Lobbyists and lobbying 
organizations conceivably could be held liable for deliberately encouraging violations of the 
congressional ethics rules, but the burden of compliance to the rules remains predominantly on 
congressional members and staff. Possible penalties vary widely, depending on the nature of the 
infraction. 
 
 Foremost among these new ethical constraints is the ban on a member participating in an 
event at the convention honoring that member if it is hosted by a lobbyist or lobbying 
organization.41  
 
 This rule expressly prohibits members of Congress from attending any convention party thrown 
by a lobbyist or lobbying organization where a specific member or members are identified by name 
and title as the honoree (including as a “special guest”) as well as events honoring a group composed 
solely of members, such as a congressional committee or congressional caucus. Member participation 
also is prohibited if the member receives some special benefit or opportunity that would not be 
available to some or all of the other participants, such as if the sponsor were to offer the member an 
exclusive speaking role or a very prominent ceremonial role. 
 
 The prohibition does not apply to an event where a member is a featured speaker, as long as the 
speaking engagement is not exclusive to the member or billed as an event designed primarily to 
recognize the work of the member. 
 
 This is precisely how the Senate ethics committee has interpreted the rule, issuing guidelines to 
that effect. The House ethics committee, however, has issued erroneous guidelines on this matter, 
which are likely to cause confusion and possibly violations of the rule at the upcoming convention. In 
describing the nature of the rule, the House ethics committee has interpreted the ban on parties 
honoring a member as not applying to parties that honor groups of members in which no specific 
member is identified, such as congressional committees or caucuses.42 The House ethics committee has 
                                                 
40
  Glen Justice and Marion Burros, “Parties Are Big Business at the New York Convention,” New York Times (Aug. 
28, 2004). 
41
  House Rule XXV(8); Senate Rule XXXV(5). 
42
  House Ethics Manual, p. 78. 
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also limited application of the rule to the formal dates of the convention itself, rather than the heavy 
party weekends immediately before and after the convention. 
 
 Both narrowing constructions by the House ethics committee are inappropriate and fail to 
honor the letter and spirit of the rule. The clear intent of the rule is to prohibit lobbyists from hosting 
parties honoring one, two or 100 members, either specifically or by committee or caucus name. The 
Consumer Electronics Association throwing a bash for the congressional committee that oversees its 
legislative interests is precisely the type of influence peddling that this rule is intended to curtail. 
Additionally, host committees publicize in their master lists parties that immediately precede and 
follow the formal convention dates, reflecting the fact that the influence-peddling soirees directly 
related to the conventions are not limited to the formal convention dates. 
 
 A convention-related party hosted by a lobbying organization that honors a member or multiple 
members of Congress is a violation of congressional ethics rules. 
 
 Congressional gift rules also prohibit members and staff from accepting gifts from lobbyists or 
lobbying organizations at the conventions, except under the following circumstances: 
 
• Reception – Members and staff may attend a reception hosted by a lobbying organization, and 
accept food and refreshment of nominal value offered other than as part of a meal. This is 
known as the “toothpick rule.” 
• Widely attended event – Members and staff may accept dinner, refreshments and 
entertainment at a widely attended event. An event is considered widely attended when at least 
25 persons from outside Congress are expected to attend and several other conditions are met. 
The event must be open to members from a given industry or profession, or to a range of 
persons interested in an issue. The member’s attendance and participation should be related to 
official duties. Free attendance does not include entertainment collateral to the event, such as 
tickets to a sporting or some other purely recreational event, such as a concert. The exemption 
also does not cover food or refreshments that are not taken in a group setting with substantially 
all of the other attendees. 
• Charity event – Members and staff may accept free attendance at a charity event, provided the 
primary purpose of the event is to raise funds for a legitimate charitable organization. 
• Campaign fundraiser – Members and staff may accept free food, refreshments and 
entertainment in connection with any fundraising events sponsored by party organizations, 
campaign committees and other political organizations. Such fundraising events must comply 
with federal or state campaign finance limits and disclosure requirements. 
• Convention event – Members and staff may accept food, refreshments, entertainment or other 
gifts offered by the convention committees, party organizations and federal, state and local 
governments. 
 
 To read the House ethics committee guidance, click here (or visit 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/House%20convention%20guidance.pdf). For the Senate ethics 
committee guidance, click here (or visit 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Senate%20convention%20guidance.pdf). 
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 Because of the new rules, receptions will be the most common type of party hosted by lobbyists 
and lobbying organizations at the 2008 conventions. Many organizations will host events designed to 
be widely attended, but due to the many qualifications of what constitutes such an event, including that 
it must be pertinent to the lawmaker’s official duties, these will not be nearly as common as receptions. 
Some lobbying organizations plan to feature purely recreational concerts (other than background 
entertainment at a reception), in which case members and staff should pay market value to attend. 
Congressional officials may only attend purely recreational events for free only if they are sponsored 
by the convention committees or governmental entities.  
 
 So far, more parties are planned for the Democratic national convention this year than for the 
Republican national convention – a reversal of the pattern at the 2004 national conventions. Lobbying 
activity naturally tends to follow the party in power. Four years ago, the Republicans were the party in 
power and so more lobbyists flocked to New York with their soirees. This year, as the Democrats are 
in the majority in the House of Representatives and are favored to extend their control over both 
chambers, the party master list reflects that change. Of course, many of the larger corporate sponsors 
prudently play both party conventions. [For a list of the parties, originally sourced by the Sunlight 
Foundation, currently scheduled for the Democratic convention, click here and for the Republican 




C. Conclusion: Lobbyists Gone Wild 
 
 Corporations and their lobbyists see the national nominating conventions as ideal opportunities 
to buy access and influence with the presidential campaigns, lawmakers and party leaders. The 
conventions constitute a campaign media blitz for the campaigns, and a golden opportunity for 
lobbyists to extend their lobbying activity off Capitol Hill. 
 
 The soft money loophole created by the FEC has derailed part of the original intent of the 1974 
presidential public financing program: to remove the potentially corrupting corporate money (IT&T 
money, in particular) from the convention proceedings. Ironically, AT&T is now one of the leading 
funders of the 2008 conventions, along with a plethora of other corporate interests with business 
pending before the federal government. 
 
 The FEC should reverse its previous rulings on corporate sponsorship of host committees and 
municipal funds. If the FEC will not step up to the plate, and there is no indication that it will do so, 
then Congress must close the loophole when it strengthens and updates the presidential public 
financing system. 
 
 Meanwhile, corporate lobbyists will be running wild, partying, schmoozing and lobbying at the 
national conventions. Though new ethics rules are forcing significant adjustments in the behavior of 
lobbyists and lobbying organizations at the conventions, there is still confusion and some disregard for 
the rules. 
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 A few of the parties described on the host committee master lists suggest they may indeed be 
crossing the line. An AT&T-sponsored party at the Democratic national convention celebrating the 
Blue Dog Coalition appears to violate the letter of the ethics rules, despite the “green light” given by 
the House ethics committee in its guidance. The same can be said for an AT&T reception at the 
Republican national convention honoring the Republican Main Street Partnership, another 
congressional caucus. The Human Rights Campaign appears to be hosting a party in Denver to honor 
the Congressional Black Caucus, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and the Asian Pacific Caucus in 
violation of the ban on lobbyists honoring members of Congress. And the Minnesota Agri-Growth 
Council is stepping very near the line in throwing a $1 million widely attended bash in Minneapolis 
featuring the band Styx for entertainment. 
 
 It is imperative that members of Congress and their staff clearly understand the ethics rules and 
approach the party scene prudently – better yet, they should steer clear of lobbyist-funded events 
altogether. The House ethics committee needs to revisit its guidance and make it consistent with the 
new ethics rules. And the public and press must do their best to monitor the convention festivities to 
ensure compliance with the rules.  
 
 
Craig Holman, Ph.D., Angela Canterbury and Zoe Bridges-Curry authored this report. Find this 
report online at www.SayNoToLobbyists.org. 
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